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SECURITIES-SECTION 12(1) SELLER LIABILITY LIMITED TO PER-
SONS WHO PASS TITLE OR SOLICIT SECURITIES SALES FOR FINAN-
CIAL GAIN. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988).
Billy J. Pinter, a registered securities dealer, sold unregistered se-
curities consisting of fractional undivided interests in oil and gas
leases to Maurice Dahl. Dahl touted the venture to other investors,
all of whom were either his friends or members of his family, and
helped them complete subscription agreements prepared by Pinter.
Dahl did not receive a commission from Pinter for soliciting other
investors. When the venture failed, Dahl and the other investors sued
Pinter in federal district court seeking rescission under section 12(1)'
of the Securities Act of 19332 for the unlawful sale of unregistered
securities. Pinter counterclaimed against Dahl arguing, among other
things, that Dahl was liable for contribution to Pinter if Pinter was
liable to the other plaintiffs.'
After a bench trial, the district court granted judgment for the
investors. The court rejected Pinter's claim of exemption from regis-
tration of the securities as a private offering4 and because the securi-
ties lacked registration, held Pinter liable to the investors under
section 12(1).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
1. Section 12(1) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who-(l) offers or sells a security in violation of section [5] ... shall be
liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or
in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
3. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2069 n.9 (1988). Pinter also argued that Dahl's claim
was barred by the equitable defense of in pari delicto. The Supreme Court held that the in pari
delicto defense is available in a suit for rescission under § 12(1), thereby extending its holding
in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985), and directed the dis-
trict court on remand to determine whether Pinter proved the elements of the defense. Pinter,
108 S. Ct. at 2070-75. This casenote will not discuss the Court's holding on the in pari delicto
issue, but will confine its analysis to the second issue presented to the Court: whether Dahl
could be found to be a "seller" under § 12(1) and therefore arguably liable to make contribu-
tion to Pinter.
4. A number of exemptions enable issuers to avoid the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933. Section 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982), relieves "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering" from registration. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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the decision in favor of the investors and denied Pinter's counterclaim
for contribution against Dahl.' While no code provision specifically
allows a right of contribution, the court assumed that Dahl could be
liable for contribution to Pinter if Dahl's activities in soliciting the
other investors rendered Dahl a "seller" within the meaning of section
12(l).6 Citing Fifth Circuit precedent, the court defined "seller" as
"one whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial
factor in causing the transaction to take place."7 However, the court
refined its substantial factor test to include a requirement that a pro-
moter of unregistered securities must "be motivated by a desire to
confer a direct or indirect benefit on someone other than the person
he has advised to purchase." 8 The court concluded that although
Dahl's activities were a substantial factor in causing the other inves-
tors to purchase the securities, he was not a "seller" because there was
no evidence that he sought or received a financial benefit for himself
or anyone other than the other respondents.9
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's
requirement that one have an expectation-of-financial-benefit in order
to qualify as a "seller" within the meaning of section 12(1). The
Court, in a seven-to-one decision, held that a nonowner of securities
must not only solicit the purchase but must also be motivated in part
by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities
owner. The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's previous version of the
substantial factor test and ruled that a person does not become liable
under section 12(1) merely because his actions were a substantial fac-
tor in causing the sale of unregistered securities. The Court remanded
the case for further factual findings to determine whether Dahl was
liable as a statutory "seller" under section 12(1). Pinter v. Dahl, 108
S. Ct. 2063 (1988).
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933'0 to provide inves-
tors with all material information relating to public offerings of secur-
ities, to protect investors against fraud, and to promote honesty and
fair dealing." Section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes
liability on a seller of securities sold in violation of section 5.12 The
5. Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988).
6. Id. at 990 n.8.
7. Id. at 990.
8. Id. at 990-91.
9. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
11. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (makes it unlawful to sell or deliver a security in interstate
commerce if the security is unregistered).
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Act does not delineate who may be regarded as a "statutory seller"
for purposes of section 12, and courts have struggled in their efforts to
define the term in a uniform manner.13 The definitions range from a
literal construction of the term "seller," requiring strict privity,"4 to
various liberal approaches 5 expanding section 12 liability beyond the
security titleholder. 6
Courts that follow the strict privity approach interpret "seller"
according to its plain meaning and impose liability only on the imme-
diate seller of the security to the purchaser.'7 However, most of these
courts have concluded that brokers acting as agents are in privity with
securities purchasers and therefore within the definition of seller. For
example, Cady v. Murphy 8 holds that strict privity exists between the
purchaser and a broker-dealer who sells the securities as an agent as
well as between the titleholder of the security and the purchaser.' 9
13. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2076 (1988).
14. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive rights of property. See, e.g., Upper
Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. Seafarers' Intern. Union of Canada, 40 Ill. App. 2d 392, 189 N.E.2d
753 (1963); Mitchell v. Austin, 266 Ala. 128, 94 So. 2d 391 (1957).
15. See infra notes 29-48 and accompanying text (participation, proximate cause, and sub-
stantial factor approaches).
16. In addition to the theories based on primary liability as a "seller," some courts have
recognized that persons other than a statutory seller can be secondarily liable for violation of
§ 12. For example, some courts have imposed liability on defendants for aiding and abetting
the primary wrongdoer in some manner. See, e.g., Mayer v. Oil Field Sys., 803 F.2d 749 (2d
Cir. 1986); Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 637 F. Supp. 938 (D. Mass. 1986); In re
Caesars Palace Sec., 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Caesars Palace was among the first
cases recognizing aiding and abetting liability under § 12. The court concluded that § 12 aid-
ing and abetting liability was consistent with "the broad, remedial nature of the [Securities]
Act and [cited] the need to adopt a liberal interpretation of the statute in order to best effectu-
ate the congressional purpose." Id. at 382-83. However, the courts have not generally
adopted the aiding and abetting principles in § 12 cases, probably because most courts have
adopted a definition of "seller" broad enough to encompass persons whose conduct might
otherwise fall within the ambit of aiding and abetting liability. Abrams, The Scope of Liability
Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: "Participation" and the Pertinent Legislative
Materials, 15 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 877, 943-44 (1987).
A person may be liable under the aiding and abetting approach if: (1) an independent
wrong exists; (2) the aider and abetter knew of the wrong's existence; and (3) the aider and
abetter renders substantial assistance in effecting the wrong. See generally Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 620-46 (1972).
17. See Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979); Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); see also O'Hara, Erosion
of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Mean-
ing of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921, 931 n.30 (1984); Note, Seller Liability Under Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Proximate Cause-Substantial Factor Approach Limited by
a Duty ofInquiry, 36 VAND. L. REV. 361 (1983).
18. 113 F.2d 988 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
19. Id. at 990-91.
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The court ruled that the broker would be in strict privity even if he
acts as agent for both the owner and purchaser. 20 The court stated
that the "broader interpretation of section .12(2)21 is warranted by the
definition of 'sell' in section 2(3)22 and is also supported by compari-
son with other sections of the statute.
23
After Cady many courts expanded the meaning of seller to in-
clude persons other than brokers or persons who pass title. Won-
neman v. Stratford Securities Co., 24 introduced the broad concept of
"participation." In Wonneman the plaintiff purchased unregistered
securities from a broker-dealer firm that made the sales as a principal
after purchasing the securities. The plaintiff sued the brokerage firm,
the issuer of the securities, individual employees of the issuer, and the
broker-dealer firm.25 The court denied a summary judgment motion
by two of the individual defendants and stated that in order to avoid
section 12(1) liability, defendants "must show that they did not par-
ticipate in the sale and not merely that they did not actually sell the
securities to plaintiff."'26 The same court, on rehearing, limited the
scope of the approach by requiring "some degree of privity" between
the purchaser and the seller.27 The court refused to extend section 12
liability to an attorney who was partially involved in the securities
20. Id.
21. Cady was brought under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1982) which provides a security purchaser with a rescissory cause of action for misrepresenta-
tion. Most courts define "seller" similarly for purposes of § 12(1) and § 12(2). See, e.g., Pharo
v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 665-68 & nn.6-8 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Schillner v. H. Vaughan
Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Clearly the word ["sell"] has the same
meaning in subdivision (2) as in subdivision (1) of section 12"). Thus, decisions under § 12(2)
are relevant to the issue of § 12(1) seller liability.
22. Section 2(3) provides in pertinent part:
Sec. 2. When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires...
(3) The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell," "offer for sale,"
or "offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer
to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982).
23. 113 F.2d at 990. The court added that if the security in question had been one re-
quired by law to be registered, the broker-dealer would have been guilty of selling a security in
violation of § 5 and would not have come within the private offering exemption provided in
§ 4(2). Id. at 990-91.
24. [1957-61 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,923 (S.D.N.Y. June 26,
1959).
25. Id. at 92,963.
26. Id.




Freed v. Szabo Food Services 29 follows the broad participation ap-
proach stated in Wonneman. The court held that a plaintiff can main-
tain a cause of action under section 12(2) despite the lack of strict
privity "as long as plaintiffs' alleged purchase was in reliance upon
misrepresentation and participation in these misrepresentations by the
defendant."30 The court also noted that strict privity between the
seller and the purchaser should no longer be a requirement to find
seller liability.31 As in Wonneman, the court did not base its reason-
ing on section 12's language. Rather, the court relied on the remedial
purposes of the securities laws as a reason to construe the statute
liberally. 32
Subsequent to some courts upholding section 12 causes of action
against persons who remotely participated in a securities transaction,
other courts attempted to articulate a standard to define the outer
limits of section 12 liability. Lennerth v. Mendenhall33 utilizes partic-
ipation as the basis for seller liability, but states that section 12 liabil-
ity "must lie somewhere between the narrow view, which holds
[liable] only the parties to the sale, the too-liberal view which would
hold [liable] all who remotely participated in the events leading up to
the transaction."34 The decision crafts a theory grounded in common
law tort principles that imposes liability as a "seller" on a nonowner
of securities if the plaintiff's injury flows directly and proximately
from the particular defendant's conduct.35 This theory premises sec-
tion 12 liability on proximate cause. 36 The court looked at the de-
fendants' actions throughout the selling process and imposed section
12(1) liability not only on the company that issued the securities and
28. Id.
29. [1961-64 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,317 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1964).
30. Id. at 94,365.
31. Id.
32. "The securities laws are remedial and are to be construed liberally in order to achieve
the congressional purpose." See Freed v. Szabo Food Services, [1961-64 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,365. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976)
(recognizing Congress' "broad remedial goals" in enacting the securities laws and providing
civil remedies).
33. 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
34. Id. at 65.
35. Id.
36. A "proximate cause" is that cause which the effect might be expected to follow with-
out the concurrence of any unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Antler v. Cox, 27 Idaho 517, 149
P. 731 (1915). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "proximate cause" as "[t]hat which, in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103
(5th ed. 1979).
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transferred title, but also on the company's president, vice president,
and another employee.
3 7
Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc.,3" also
adopts the proximate cause rationale. The case rejects the participa-
tion concept, which imposes liability on anyone who participates in
the sales transaction, as overly broad. 39 The court cites Lennerth's
proximate cause theory as a rational and workable standard for impo-
sition of liability under section 12.40 The Fifth Circuit refined its ap-
proach two years later in Lewis v. Walston & Co.4" to impose liability
on a nontransferor defendant whose activities were a "substantial fac-
tor ' 4 2 in causing the plaintiffs to purchase unregistered securities.
The Fifth Circuit articulated its substantial factor approach more
clearly in Pharo v. Smith,43 stating that the scope of section 12 liability
was limited to 1) those in privity with the purchaser and 2) those
whose participation in the securities transaction was a substantial fac-
tor in causing the transaction to take place."
The substantial factor test became the dominant concept regard-
ing seller liability under section 12. The United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fourth,45 Sixth,46 Eighth,47 and Eleventh' 8 Circuits have
followed the Fifth Circuit's substantial factor approach to determine
section 12 liability. The Ninth Circuit adopted its own version of the
test, imposing section 12 liability on " 'participants' whose acts are
37. 234 F. Supp. at 65-66.
38. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). The court held that promoters of a franchising scheme
were § 12 sellers.
39. Id. at 692.
40. Id. at 693.
41. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
42. "The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a
substantial factor in bringing it about." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41, at 267 (5th ed. 1984).
43. 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 667. By refusing in Dahl to impose liability on Dahl under the substantial
factor test, the Fifth Circuit broke with the import of precedent, adding an expectation-of-
financial-benefit refinement to the test.
45. Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th Cir. 1978) (section 12(1) liability extends
to "all persons whose actions are a substantial factor in causing a purchaser to buy a
security").
46. Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., 739 F.2d 1057, 1067 (6th Cir. 1984) (imposing § 12(2) liabil-
ity on "participants in the selling effort whose acts meet the substantial factor test"), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985).
47. Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981).
48. Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 759 F.2d 838, 843-44 (11 th Cir. 1985) (determin-
ing the "scope of section 12" by applying Fifth Circuit decisions as "controlling" in this
circuit).
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'both necessary to and a substantial factor in the sales transaction.' "'I
The strict privity view prevailed in the Third5" and Seventh"' Circuits.
In the circuits where the interpretation of liability remained an open
question, most district courts adopted the substantial factor
approach. 52
The substantial factor test, however, has not been free from criti-
cism. First, the substantial factor test offers very little guidance apart
from the words "substantial factor,"'5 3 and application of the test has
not been uniform among the circuits. Second, as with the earlier
"participation test" cases, courts adopting the substantial factor ap-
proach did not seriously attempt to interpret the language of section
12 or refer to pertinent legislative history. The Fifth Circuit decisions
in Hill York Corp.54 and Lewis55 simply embraced the conclusion that
the substantial factor test was consistent with the Securities Act's re-
medial purposes. For the most part, the other circuits and lower
courts adopting the approach merely followed Fifth Circuit precedent
and failed to engage in any meaningful statutory analysis.56
Pinter v. Dahl" presented the United States Supreme Court with
the question of whether a person must intend to confer a benefit on
himself or a third party in order to be deemed a "statutory seller" for
the purposes of section 12(l).58 In determining the scope of section
49. Anderson v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting SEC v. Murphy, 626
F.2d 633, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1980)).
50. Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979) (section 12(2) liability
imposed only on the "immediate seller" unless a "special relationship" exists between the
plaintiff and a third party defendant).
51. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1979) (section 12(2)
"explicitly requires privity between plaintiff-purchaser and defendant-seller"), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1005 (1981).
52. See cases cited at Abrams, supra note 16, at 891-92 & n.87.
53. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
55. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
56. Abrams, supra note 16, at 892-94 & nn.89-97.
57. 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988).
58. Id. at 2067. The Court addressed the question whether Dahl was a seller for purposes
of § 12(1) on the assumption that if the question was answered affirmatively, Dahl might be
liable for contribution as to the remaining investor-respondents' claims against Pinter. The
issue of Dahl's liability to Pinter for contribution was independent of the issue regarding
whether or not Dahl's actions barred recovery against Pinter pursuant to the in pari delicto
doctrine. See supra note 3; 108 S. Ct. at 2075 n.17. The majority did not determine whether a
right of contribution exists under § 12(1). 108 S. Ct. at 2070 n.9. Justice Stevens, arguing that
the contribution issue was not properly before the Court, wrote a strong dissent. 108 S. Ct. at
2083 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also stated that even if a right to contribution
exists under § 12(1), it should not be available in an action for rescission to allow "a seller to
recover from a third party who did not receive any part of the purchase price." Id. at 2086.
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12(1) liability, the Court first looked at the language of the statute.5 9
The Court noted that section 12(1) defines the class of defendants who
may be subject to liability as any person who "offers or sells" unregis-
tered securities.' To determine whether section 12(1) liability ex-
tends to persons other than the owner of securities who passes title,6 '
the Court looked to section 2(3)62 of the Securities Act and concluded
that the inclusion of the phrase "solicitation of an offer to buy" within
the definition of "offer" brings an individual who engages in solicita-
tion within the scope of section 12.63 Thus, the Court concluded that
transactions other than traditional sales of securities are within the
scope of section 2(3) and that passage of title is not essential for impo-
sition of liability under section 12(1). 64
After determining the activities which fall within the range of
"offer" or "sell" in section 2(3), the Court addressed section 12(1)'s
requirement that the plaintiff "purchase" the securities "from" the
defendant. 65 The Court rejected the view that this language of section
12(1) imposes a strict privity requirement. 66 While the purchase re-
quirement confines section 12 liability to situations in which a sale has
taken place,67 the purchase requirement does not exclude solicitation
from the range of activities that may render a person liable under the
section when a sale has been made.68
The Court then interpreted the term "purchase," which is not
defined by the Securities Act, "as a correlative to both sell and 'of-
fer'," at least to the extent "offer" involves active solicitation.69 Thus,
the Court concluded "that the class of those from whom the buyer
'purchases' extend[s] to persons who solicit him."70
59. Id. at 2075.
60. Id. at 2076.
61. The Court concluded that on its face, § 12(l) "imposes liability on the owner who
passed title, or other interest in the security, to the buyer for value." Id. (citing L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1016 (2d ed. 1988)).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982).
63. 108 S. Ct. at 2076.
64. The Court relied on its analogous holdings on the question of what is an "offer or
sale" under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982)). 108 S. Ct. at
2076. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979); see also Rubin v. United States, 449
U.S. 424 (1981).
65. 108 S. Ct. at 2077.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Court found that the purchase requirement bars recovery under § 12(1) by "a
prospective buyer ... against a person who touts unregistered securities to him if he does not
purchase the securit[y]." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2078.
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The Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend section 12(1) liability to extend to persons who
merely give gratuitous advice to another to make a securities
purchase. The Court noted that section 2(3) defines an offer as a "so-
licitation of an offer to buy.., for value" and that a person who gives
advice gratuitously is not requesting value in exchange for his sugges-
tion.7' Thus, the Court concluded that the language and purpose of
section 12(1) suggest that imposition of seller liability extends only to
persons who successfully solicit the purchase, motivated at least in
part by a desire to serve the soliciting person's own financial interest
or that of the securities owner.72
Once the Court extended section 12(1) primary liability to one
who solicits securities sales for financial gain, it refused to make any
further extension. The Court rejected Pinter's request to validate the
substantial factor test used by the Fifth Circuit prior to its expecta-
tion-of-financial-benefit refinement of the test in this court case.73 The
Court noted that section 12's failure to impose express liability for
mere participation suggests that Congress did not intend to impose
liability on persons collateral to the offer of sale 4.7  The Court also
noted that the substantial factor test divorces the analysis of "seller"
from any reference to the statutory language of section 12 or examina-
tion of the section in the context of the Securities Act's statutory
scheme. 5
Pinter's sole justification of the substantial factor analysis was
that it protects investors and serves the "remedial purposes" of the
Securities Act.76 The Court agreed that it has previously construed
securities law provisions flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes,
but noted that it had never conducted its analysis entirely apart from
the statutory language. 7 The Court stated that the broad remedial
goals of the Securities Act were insufficient justification to support the
substantial factor test and that being merely a "substantial factor"
was insufficient to render a defendant liable under section 12(1).71
The Pinter case is significant because the Supreme Court finally
71. Id. at 2078-79.
72. Id. at 2079.
73. Id. at 2079-82.
74. Id. at 2080.
75. Id.; see supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
76. 108 S. Ct. at 2081.
77. Id. at 2082.
78. Id.
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addressed the issue of who is a "seller" for purposes of section 12(1).1 9
The decision provides guidelines for the courts so that determination
of section 12(1) liability will no longer be by judicial implication based
solely on the broad remedial purposes of the Securities Act. More-
over, the Court's rejection of the substantial factor approach clearly
places accountants, lawyers, and other persons who participate in the
transaction, but who are only remotely related to the relevant aspects
of the transaction, outside the scope of section 12(1) liability.A0
"The 'offers or sells' and the 'purchasing such security from him'
language that governs § 12(1) also governs § 12(2)."' aI Even though
the Court did not decide whether the definition of seller for purposes
of section 12(1) also applies to section 12(2), ordinary principles of
statutory construction would apparently dictate that the same con-
struction be given to the identical language 2 and most courts -apply
the same meaning to "seller" in both provisions.8 3 Because section
12(2) liability requires fault on the part of the defendant,84 it is less
likely that the Court would apply a more restrictive test. 5
In an attempt to broaden the class of potential section 12 defend-
ants beyond Pinter's relatively narrow reach, plaintiffs will probably
seek to use the aiding and abetting approach to bring accountants,
lawyers, and other persons whose participation in the securities trans-
79. The Court had consistently denied certiorari in cases dealing with § 12 seller liability.
See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005
(1985); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1005 (1981); Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
80. 108 S. Ct. at 2081.
81. Id. at 2076 n.20.
82. Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The Privity Requirement in the
Contemporary Securities Law Perspective, 51 TENN. L. REv. 235, 261 (1984). The general
rebuttable presumption of formal consistency is that the draftsman "has not changed his
meaning unless he has varied his terminology." R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 224 (1975).
83. See, e.g., Cady, 113 F.2d at 991 ("the phrase 'any person who sells a security' occurs
both in § 12(1) and in § 12(2), and would seem to mean the same thing in both subsec-
tions .. "); see also supra note 21.
84. Section 12(2) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who .. .(2) offers or sells a security .. .by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements ... not misleading ... shall be liable to the person purchasing
such security from him ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
85. In Hill York Corp., 448 F.2d 680, the court suggested a broader definition of seller for
purposes of § 12(2) but found it unnecessary to expand the definition under the facts of the
case.
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action are relatively remote within the scope of section 12(1) liabil-
ity. 6 However, both the statutory language and the legislative history
of section 12 fail to address aiding and abetting liability 7 and the
courts are divided over whether aiding and abetting liability should
apply to section 12.88
By limiting the scope of section 12(1) liability, the Court has di-
minished the protections given to purchasers of securities by the vari-
ous circuits which have interpreted the statute liberally. However,
this limitation does not leave purchasers totally unprotected from per-
sons who are not "sellers" subject to liability under section 12(1).
Section 1589 makes a person who "controls" any person liable under
section 12 jointly and severally to the same extent as the controlled
person. Additionally, the vast majority of states have enacted blue
sky laws9° which impose liability for aiding and abetting or assisting
in securities violations.9' Thus, investors will probably seek to impose
liability on sellers under other methods available to them in situations
where plaintiffs previously utilized section 12(1).
Stan D. Smith
86. The Court did not consider whether aiding and abetting liability is appropriate under
§ 12(1). 108 S. Ct. at 2079 n.24.
87. Abrams, supra note 16, at 944.
88. The Second Circuit approved imposition of aiding and abetting liability in Mayer v.
Oil Field Sys., 803 F.2d 749, 756 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit rejected the approach in
Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 713 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit rejected imposi-
tion of aiding and abetting liability in Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981). See
also supra note 16.
89. Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more
other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any
person liable under sections (11 or 12 of the Act], shall also be liable jointly and
severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the exist-
ence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
90. Blue sky laws are state securities laws which regulate the sales of securities to purchas-
ers within the jurisdiction.
91. Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have passed blue sky laws which cre-
ate private rights of action that expressly impose primary liability for aiding, aiding and abet-
ting, or assisting in securities violations. See Abrams, supra note 16, at 945-46 n.423. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-106(c) (1987) ("every employee.., who materially aids in the sale;
and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale").

